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The biggest crypto heist in history started on a laptop: what the Binance hack (6.43 billion USD) teaches about protecting the computers of your Mexico operation

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On October 30 this was a crypto story. Two days later it was something else: the FBI attributed the theft of 6.43 billion dollars from Binance, the largest in history, to TraderTraitor, a group tied to North Korea. And the Mexican press added the detail that matters to anyone running a business: it all reportedly started from an employee’s laptop.

Your Mexico operation does not run a crypto exchange. But it does have a local accountant who logs in to the bank, and an IT admin, in-house or outsourced, who holds the keys to everything. This post is about those two computers.

6.43 billion USD the record heist the FBI attributes to North Korea
1 laptop where it reportedly began, according to Mexican press reports
Oct 31 the day the FBI named TraderTraitor

What happened at Binance, and why it is not a crypto story

The usual shortcut Nobody cracked the vault. Someone convinced a person to open something on their own computer.

On November 1, The Hacker News reported the FBI’s formal attribution to TraderTraitor, a group that has spent years tricking employees at financial firms. A day earlier, Expansión was already pointing at North Korean attackers, and other Mexican outlets highlighted that the intrusion reportedly began on a staff laptop.

Look at the pattern. The platform did not fail. A work computer served as the bridge. That works the same against an exchange and against a plant in Querétaro that pays suppliers every Friday.

Why the accountant’s laptop is the crown jewel

At a Mexico site run from abroad there are usually two or three computers worth more than all the others combined. The local accountant’s PC, with the bank token and the SAT digital seals (the certificates used to issue invoices in Mexico). The country manager’s laptop, which approves transfers. And the computer of whoever administers systems, who can create users and reset anyone’s password.

In our experience those machines often run the same free antivirus as the front desk. Sometimes less, because “nothing that gets in the way can be installed there”. And head office rarely sees them: they were bought locally, sit outside the corporate domain and belong to nobody in particular.

Whoever wants your money does not attack the printer. They go after the person who can move it.

How a laptop like that gets compromised

Three paths, one trick An email, a recruiter or a free installer. All of them get the person to open the door themselves.

Three paths come up again and again, and none of them requires a genius.

PathWhat it looks like at the officeWhat stops it
Targeted phishingAn email from “the bank” or a supplier asking to review an attached invoiceMFA and a mail filter that flags external senders
Fake job offerA LinkedIn recruiter sends a “technical test” to open on the work PCA clear rule: nothing personal on work devices, and nothing from work on personal ones
Poisoned softwareA free installer or add-on with a hidden extraOnly IT installs; users work without admin rights

TraderTraitor is known for the second path: job offers with a “test” file. If someone in finance at your Mexico site receives one, they should say so before opening it. And if what arrives is a call from a “technician” asking for remote access, here is how to verify who is asking.

What fits in the budget of a Mexico site

Six measures, no drama None of them means buying new hardware. Almost all are configuration and discipline.
  1. Non-privileged accounts for daily work. The admin reads email with a normal account and uses a separate one only when administering. The wrong click no longer holds every key.
  2. MFA on email, banking and cloud. Passkeys if possible; here is why.
  3. EDR or managed antivirus. An antivirus somebody actually watches: it alerts when a strange program tries to read passwords and lets us isolate the device remotely, from Mexico or from your side.
  4. Patches up to date on Windows, the browser and Office. Boring, yes. It also closes half the doors.
  5. Separate finance machines. The PC used for banking should not be the one where résumés get opened. A modest, dedicated laptop is enough.
  6. Two-person approval for payments. The person who enters the payment is not the one who releases it. Ask your Mexican bank about dual authorization on the business account.
Work laptop on an office desk
Tell us which computers move money at your Mexico site and we check them with you Foto: Pexels

And at your Mexico operation?

If nobody at head office can say today how many computers in Mexico can send a transfer or create a user, that is the first task. The second is removing admin rights from daily use.

At ProcessBi the support plan includes hardening and monitoring of critical devices and a periodic review of privileged access, reported in English to head office. To start, we offer a free assessment of the “computers that can move money” at your Mexico site.

Book your assessment — we reply the same business day.

Your path

Running IT in Mexico from abroad

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